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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether chronic stress and acute physiological responses to 
competitive stress can explain individual and gender differences in competitiveness. We 
measure individuals' autonomic nervous system activity in a resting state as well as under 
non-competitive and competitive incentives in a real task using heart rate variability 
measurement. We find that basal heart rate variability, a proxy for chronic stress, and 
acute competition-induced changes in heart rate variability predict self-selection into 
competition. Moreover, we observe that basal heart rate variability predicts self-selection 
into competition for women, but not for men. Overall, we find tentative evidence for gender 
differences in the relationship between physiological stress and a decision to enter 
competitive environments. Our results suggest that individual variation in autonomic 
nervous system activity and physiological responses to competitive stress predict self-
selection into competitive environments, but do not explain gender differences in 
willingness to compete. 
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1 Introduction
Substantial anecdotal and scientific evidence suggests that women are more reluctant to compete than
men. Various studies document that men tend to improve their performance in competitive environments
more than women (Gneezy et al. 2003; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). In the same vein, several studies show
that women may shy away from competition more often than men, even though there often are no gender
differences in performance (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011; Niederle et
al. 2013). Gender differences in competitiveness seem to emerge at an early age (Gneezy and Rustichini,
2004; Glätzle-Rützler and Sutter, 2014) and be stronger in math-related tasks than in writing-related tasks
(Günther et al., 2009; Dreber et al., 2014). The gender gap in competitiveness is documented across
several societies (e.g. Andersen et al., 2013; Almås et al., 2014). However, there is also evidence
suggesting that men and women compete equally in certain societies and circumstances (Dreber et al.,
2011; Cardenas et al., 2012). Lately, Zhang (2014) and Buser et al. (2014) have investigated the external
relevance of experimental designs developed to measure competitiveness and show that experimentally
elicited preferences for competition are strongly correlated with the propensity to take a highly
competitive high school entrance exam in China and to choose more prestigious academic tracks in Dutch
secondary schools.
It is often argued that gender differences in competitiveness may provide an explanation for pervasive
gender differences in labor market outcomes, educational attainment and political empowerment. To
understand the connection between gender differences in willingness to compete and gender differences
in career paths and earnings, it is important to identify biological and cultural determinants behind the
gender differences in willingness to compete. However, relative little is known about the underlying
psychological and physiological mechanisms that may explain the under-representation of women in
competitive environments. Our study aims to contribute to the understanding of human competitiveness
by investigating whether physiological measures of chronic and acute competitive stress can explain
individual and gender differences in competitiveness.
A number of studies have lately recognized the importance of gender in people’s physiological responses
to stressful events and experiences. These studies show that men tend to have greater cardiovascular
response to competitive stress than women, while women typically report higher levels of chronic and
daily stress than men (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2001; APA, 2012). There is also a growing body of evidence
suggesting that various work-related stressors have a disparate effect on women and men (Tytherleigh et
1al., 2007). Consequently, it seems plausible that different physiological responses to competition-induced
acute stress and desire to avoid chronically stressful environments may explain individual and gender
differences in selection into competitive environments.
The objective of this paper is threefold: (i) to measure individuals' autonomic nervous system activity in
a resting state as well as under non-competitive and competitive incentive in a real task, (ii) to investigate
whether heart rate variability, a robust biomarker of stress-induced autonomic nervous system activity,
can explain individual and gender differences in competitiveness, and (iii) to examine whether the
relationship between autonomic nervous system activity and willingness to compete is mediated by self-
confidence and risk attitudes.
Stress is body’s response to changes in the environment that create taxing demands. The stress response
is geared to maintain our physiological and mental health in the face of acute stressors that are relatively
contained events with limited duration. The acute stress response largely helps healthy individuals to
adapt to new challenges and typically does not impose a health burden (Nelson, 2005; Rivers and Josephs,
2010). The stress response begins to falter under unremitting exposure to physiological and emotional
stressors. The effects of chronic stress on neural, cardiovascular, immunological and reproductive health
are morbid (Nelson, 2005; Sapolsky, 2005). Exposure to chronic stress also typically causes insufficient
bodily  response  to  acute  stressors  (Nelson,  2005).  In  this  paper,  we  are  particularly  interested  to
investigate people’s physiological response to competitive stress which roots from the imbalance
between performance demands in a competition and individual's perception of her abilities to
successfully meet those demands.1
In this study, we measure participants' autonomic nervous system activity using heart rate variability
(HRV) measurement. HRV is a well-established physiological indicator of stress-induced activation of
1 Like many other types of stressors, having to perform in a competitive environment may lead to a stress response which is
adaptive for coping in the short-term, but may over time have pathological impact on person's mental and physical well-being.
In colloquial language, stress is often used to only describe body's negative reactions to challenges. This practice also often
applies to epidemiological work which tries to quantify the overall impact of chronic stress on health outcomes and estimate
the costs of work-related stress in certain geographical areas and business sectors. For example, the American Psychological
Association (APA, 2009) reports that 55 percent of the employees in the U.S. consider themselves to be less productive at
work as a result of work-related stress. In the same vein, according to the APA (2007), 52 percent of the U.S. employees
report that they have considered or made a decision about their career such as looking for a new job, declining a promotion
or leaving a job based on work-related stress. The estimated overall cost of work-related stress to the U.S. industry is above
$300 billion in a year due to absenteeism, turnover, diminished productivity and medical, legal and insurance costs (Rosch,
2001).
2the autonomic nervous system (Task Force, 1996; Acharya et al., 2006). Low HRV values generally
signal high sympathetic (stimulative) nervous system activity and occur during the states of high mental
and environmental stress. Low HRV values in a resting state are associated with chronic mental and
physical distress (Task Force, 1996; Acharya et al., 2006). By contrast, high HRV values in a resting
state are associated with high parasympathetic (inhibitory) activity of the autonomic nervous system.
Thus, high HRV values in a resting state are interpreted as signals for fast physiological recovery and
good emotional regulation ability (Task Force, 1996; Acharya et al., 2006).2 While HRV in a resting state
can be interpreted as a proxy of chronic stress, short-term changes in HRV indicate acute engagement of
the sympathetic nervous system and do not enable us to assess the adaptiveness of this response.
We use two different types of HRV data in this study. First, we measure participants’ basal HRV during
a five-minute period before participation in our experiment. This baseline HRV serves as an indicator of
individuals’ autonomic nervous system activity in a resting state and measures the level of chronic
distress. The baseline HRV also creates a reference value to calculate relative changes in HRV that occur
during the experimental tasks. Second, we record participants' HRV during our experiment to measure
participants’ acute physiological stress response to non-competitive and competitive incentives. By
linking the HRV data with our measure of competitiveness, we can examine the predictive power of
objectively measured physiological data on willingness to compete in a controlled environment which
allows controlling for individuals’ performance, risk aversion, confidence and preferences for performing
in a competition.
Our paper is related to experimental studies investigating relationships between acute stress exposure,
cognitive performance and competitiveness. Angelucci and Cordova (2014) investigate the impact of
acute stress on cognitive performance and find that exposure to acute emotional stress may reduce
women’s performance and earnings compared to men’s performance and earnings in a task where
participants have to answer multiple-choice questions taken from the SAT. Buckert et al. (2015)
investigate whether having to perform in a competitive environment causes acute stress reactions. They
find that participants’ heart rate and arterial blood pressure are higher when performing under
competitive incentives than when performing under non-competitive incentives. However, they do not
find any effect on participants’ cortisol or testosterone levels. Buser et al. (2015) investigate whether an
2A number of epidemiological studies suggest that HRV in a resting state serves as an independent predictor of future health
outcomes. In particular, Zulfigar et al. (2010) shows that high HRV is associated with cardiovascular health and healthy
longevity among the elderly. Conversely, Dekker et al. (2000) show that low HRV predicts higher incidence of coronary heart
disease in the general population.
3acute stress response to mandatory competition predicts individuals’ willingness to participate in a
voluntary competition and find that salivary cortisol measured after mandatory competition does not
predict willingness to compete among men, but is positively associated with the decision to enter
competition among women.
Our investigation differs in several important aspects from the related studies. First, we measure
individuals’ heart rate variability in a resting state which serves as a proxy for chronic stress and enables
us to investigate the association between basal heart rate variability and self-selection into competitive
environments. Second, we measure individuals’ heart rate variability throughout the exposure to piece
rate and tournament incentives which resolves uncertainty about the correct number and timing of
measurements. Third, heart rate variability is known to be a particularly fast-responding and selective
measure of mental stress (Mulder, 1992). Consequently, even relatively short recordings of HRV are
likely to provide an accurate measurement of cardiovascular and nervous system response to competitive
stress.
Our results show that both basal heart rate variability and competition-induced acute stress response
predict individual self-selection into competition. Moreover, we find that basal heart rate variability
predicts self-selection into competition in a sub-sample of women, but not in a sub-sample of men.
However, the association between basal heart rate variability and participants’ decision to enter
competition is not significantly different between men and women. We find the relationship between
competition-induced acute stress response and self-selection into competition is mediated by self-
confidence among the best performing men. Overall, we find  tentative evidence for gender differences
in the relationship between physiological stress and a decision to enter competitive environments.
This study establishes an association between autonomic nervous system activity and willingness to
compete. This finding contributes to an evolving economic literature examining the origins and
determinants of individual and gender differences in competitive behavior. Our results may also
contribute to the literature examining the determinants of gender differences in labor market outcomes,
educational attainment and political empowerment. In particular, the observation that a well-established
proxy for chronic stress and acute physiological stress response to competitive incentives are associated
with the self-selection into competitive environments may provide new insights to understand how
organizational culture, work environment and occupational health affect career decisions and
development of men and women.
4Finally, our method and results may prove useful in developing alternative affirmative action policies
and evaluating the mental and physiological consequences of policies designed to facilitate the promotion
of women to high professional and managerial positions. People’s stress levels and abilities to adapt to
taxing changes are typically not fixed, but influenced by organizational culture and behavior at the
workplace. Our results, speculatively, suggest that healthy levels of occupational stress may facilitate the
self-selection of women into competitive professional positions. Likewise, policies that succeed in
reducing women’s exposure to distress at work and home may have an indirect effect on gender
differences in labor market outcomes, educational attainment and political empowerment.
2 Study design
This section documents our data collection procedure and describes variables used to examine our
research questions. First, we describe the design of our behavioral experiment. Second, we describe the
data collection procedure for the heart rate variability data and document the preprocessing of these data.
Third, we summarize other key variables used in the results section.
2.1 Experimental design
Our experimental design largely follows the within-subject design developed by Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007). The basic task in our experiment is to add up sets of five two-digit numbers for five minutes.
Participants solve these tasks individually. They are not allowed to use a calculator, but may use a scratch
paper and pencil provided by the experimental team. The numbers shown on the computer screen are
randomly drawn and presented in the following way, where participants fill in the sum in the blank box
on the screen (Fig. 1A).
The experiment consists of five tasks and resting periods before, during and after the actual tasks (Fig.
1B). We implement the resting periods to reliably measure participants’ autonomic nervous system
activity during different tasks (Niizeki and Saitoh, 2012). At the beginning of the experiment, participants
are requested to attach a heart rate variability measurement device to their chest (Fig. S1).3 There is a
two-minute practice period to familiarize with the task and screen layout. During the resting period before
3 Participants attach the HRV measurement devices to their chest by themselves. Attaching these devices is straightforward
and does not require any particular skill. Attaching the device to a female body does not substantially differ from attaching
the device to a male body.
5the experiment, participants fill a questionnaire concerning their personal background and receive written
instructions for the first task.4 Finally, there is a two-minute quiet resting period just before Task 1.
Figure 1: Task (A) and timing (B)
Participants perform the arithmetic task under different incentive schemes. The compensation scheme in
Task 1 is a non-competitive piece rate scheme. Participants receive a fixed payment of 25 eurocents for
every correct answer. We measure participants' performance by the number of attempts to solve the
problem and by the number of correct answers. The participants’ final score is determined by the number
of correctly solved problems. Participants receive feedback about their own absolute performance after
each task. They receive information about the number of attempts to solve the problem and about the
number of correct answers. Importantly, participants do not receive any feedback about the performance
of other participants before completing all experimental tasks.
The compensation scheme in the second task (Task 2) is based on a tournament between four randomly
assigned subjects. The participant who correctly solves the largest number of problems in a group is the
4 The full set of experimental instructions is made available in the Electronic Supplementary Material.
6winner and earns four times more for each correctly solved problem than in the piece rate task. In other
words, the winner earns one euro per correct answer. All other participants earn nothing. In case of a tie,
the winner is randomly chosen among the high performers. The tournament is designed so that a
performance leading to a 25 percent chance of winning the tournament receives the same expected payoff
as from the piece rate. Participants are informed before Task 2 that the gender composition in the group
is mixed.
In Task 3, participants select which of the two compensation schemes shall apply to their future
performance. If they choose the tournament scheme, their performance during the Task 3 is compared
with the performance of the other group members in Task 2. Consequently, the number of competitors
in the tournament is kept independent of other participants' decisions. This procedure guarantees that
participants' beliefs about the choices of other participants may not affect their choice. Furthermore,
winning the tournament in Task 3 does not impose negative externalities on others.
In Task 4, participants choose between the piece rate and tournament compensation scheme for the past
performance in Task 1. At this stage, participants do not perform the arithmetic task, but decide which
incentive scheme shall apply to their past piece rate performance. Before making their decisions,
participants are reminded about their absolute performance in Task 1. If they choose the tournament
compensation scheme, their performance during Task 1 will be compared with the Task 1 performance
of other group members. If an entering participant has the highest performance, he/she wins the
tournament. Task 4 is an individual decision task where participants' beliefs about the choices of other
participants may not affect their choice. Task 4 has the same payoff structure than Task 3, but eliminates
all aspects of performing in a competitive environment. Consequently, the contrast between Tasks 3 and
4 allows us to examine whether the knowledge of having to perform in a tournament affects the selection
of preferred payment schemes. Moreover, Task 4 enables us to examine whether heart rate variability
predicts tournament entry when participants do not have to perform in a competitive environment.
After the fourth task, participants are requested to guess their rank in their group in Task 1 and Task 2,
respectively. Participants are informed that they will be rewarded with one euro for each correct guess.
In the event of a tie in the actual rank, we reward every guess that could be correct. The reward
mechanism is implemented to incentivize participants to state their true beliefs about their ranking.
7After completing all arithmetic tasks,5 there is an 18-minute long resting period. During this resting
period, we elicit participants’ risk preferences using an incentivized measure for risk aversion developed
by Holt and Laury (2002) and a general measure of risk-taking propensity derived from a one-item survey
question (Dohmen et al., 2011). We elicit participants’ general willingness to compete using a one-item
survey question. Participants are requested to report their perception of task difficulty on a scale from 1
to 7, where 1 signifies very easy and 7 signifies very difficult. In addition, participants are requested to
report whether they believe that the task favors one gender over the other. In other words, we ask whether
the participants believe that men or women are able to correctly solve more problems.
At the end of the experiment, participants receive their payment based on their performance in one of the
five tasks. Participants are requested to choose one out of the five cards faced down on their computer
screen. The cards are in a random order. The chosen card determines which of the five tasks is selected
for the payment. The total payment for each participant includes a five euro show-up fee, earnings from
one randomly chosen task, earnings from the belief elicitation questions and earnings from the
incentivized measure for risk aversion. The experiment lasted about 90 minutes. Participants earned on
average 12.28 euro (Std. = 5.32).
The experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) in the PCRC Decision
Making Laboratory at the University of Turku, Finland. We used a standard subject pool which mainly
consists of university students enrolled at the University of Turku. The experiment was conducted in two
consecutive days. There were two consecutive sessions per day. There were 20 participants in each
session. The total number of participants was 80, consisting of 39 male and 41 female participants.
Invitation letters to the subject pool members stated that participants' heart rate variability will be
measured during the experiment. Only non-smoking participants were allowed to participate in the
experiment. The experimental protocol was approved in advance by the Research Ethics Committee of
the Aalto University, Finland. All subjects signed informed consent forms before participating in the
experiment. The complete experimental instructions given to participants are available in the Electronic
Supplementary Material.
5As shown in Fig. 1B, the experiment included a fifth task. In this task, participants are requested to choose between a piece
rate and tournament compensation scheme and perform the five-minute arithmetic task once again. The difference between
Task 3 and Task 5 is that in Task 5 only those participants who choose a tournament compensation scheme will be compared
with each other. Results from the fifth task are reported elsewhere.
82.2 Experimental variables
Heart rate variability. We use heart rate variability (HRV) as an indicator of stress-induced activation of
the autonomic nervous system. HRV has proven to be a reliable method to measure bodily stress for
clinical and research purposes (Task Force, 1996; Hynynen et al., 2011; Niizeki and Saitoh, 2012), but
has been rarely applied to study economic questions.6
To measure our participants' heart rate variability we used the FirstBeat Bodyguard heart rate monitor
(www.firstbeat.fi). The device is non-intrusive and attaches directly to the skin with two electrodes (Fig.
S1). For the HRV data analysis, we used Kubios HRV 2.0 software (Tarvainen et al. 2014). We identified
from the beat-to-beat interval series artifacts that are larger or smaller than 150 milliseconds compared
to the local average. We applied then cubic spline interpolation to replace these missing intervals. Finally,
the resulting corrected beat-to-beat interval series were visually inspected for potentially remaining
outliers. At this stage, we had to exclude three participants from our HRV data set due to technical
problems.7
We use the Root Mean Square of the Successive Differences (RMSSD) to measure the variation of
consecutive beat-to-beat intervals.8 We compute for each subject four different RMSSD values: one
baseline value and three task-related values. The baseline value is computed using a five-minute long
period shortly before Task 1. The values for task-related RMSSDs are calculated using a five-minute
period that matches to the performance period in Task 1, Task 2 and Task 3. In addition to the absolute
RMSSD values, we measure competition-induced changes in heart rate variability using differences in
RMSSD between Task 1 (piece rate) and Task 2 (tournament). This competition-induced relative change
6 There are only a handful of studies that apply heart rate variability measurement to study economic questions. Falk et al.
(2011) study physiological response to perceptions of unfairness and find an inverse relationship between heart rate variability
and the degree of fairness. Brandts and Garofalo (2012) examine how the gender composition of an audience impacts decision-
makers’ responsibility and heart rate variability. They do not find any relationship between gender composition of the
audience and heart rate variability. Dullect et al. (2012) examine the physiological foundations of tax compliance in a
laboratory experiment and find that higher tax compliance is associated with lower heart rate variability. Dulleck et al. (2014)
discuss the applicability of heart rate variability measurement techniques in economic experiments and illustrate the
measurement technique in an Ultimatum Game experiment. There are no prior studies examining the predictive power of
HRV on economic decisions.
7 One participant was excluded from the data set due to a technical problem with the HRV measurement device during the
measurement period. In this case, no HRV data were recorded. Two participants were excluded from the data set due to
unconceivable noise in the beat-to-beat intervals.
8 For a detailed computation of the Root Mean Square of the Successive Differences see the Electronic Supplementary
Material.
9in RMSSD measures individuals’ autonomic nervous system response to competitive incentives and is
defined as:9
ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܿℎܽ݊݃݁	݅݊	ܴܯܵܵܦ = 100 ∗ (	ܴܯܵܵܦ(ܶܽݏ݇2) − ܴܯܵܵܦ(ܶܽݏ݇1)
ܴܯܵܵܦ(ܶܽݏ݇1) ).				(1)
Willingness to compete: Participants' choice in Task 3 serves as an incentivized measure for participants’
willingness to compete.
Choice of compensation scheme for past piece-rate performance: Participants' choice in Task 4 indicates
participants’ choice of compensation scheme for past piece-rate performance. This choice provides us a
measure to gauge participants’ preferences for rank-based remuneration in the absence of having to
perform in a competitive environment.
Competition attitude: We use participants’ answers to a one-item survey question about their general
attitude to competition as a measure for their general willingness to compete. This variable takes values
from 0 to 10, where 0 denotes the lowest willingness to compete and 10 denotes the highest willingness
to compete.
Risk attitude: To assess the role of risk aversion on individuals’ willingness to compete we use a general
risk attitude question (Dohmen et al., 2011) and an incentivized risk measurement technique developed
by Holt and Laury (2002). In the general risk attitude question, participants are requested to indicate their
general risk taking willingness on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “not willing to take risk” and
10 stands for “completely willing to take risk”. The incentivized risk measurement lottery contains ten
paired lottery decisions with modest payoffs. Participants have to choose between two options in each of
the ten prospects. The break-even point where participants switch from the low risk option to the high
risk option indicates their degree of risk aversion. The full payoff table for the incentivized risk aversion
measure is available in the Electronic Supplementary Material.
Confidence in task performance: We measure participants’ confidence in their performance by eliciting
their beliefs about their relative performance in Task 1 and Task 2. In practice, participants’ are requested
to guess their rank among the group members. The lower the guessed rank (1 = the best performing group
9 We additionally use a complementary definition for competition-induced changes in heart rate variability by normalizing
the changes in RMSSD using baseline data instead of Task 1 data. We report all results in the results section using the
definition described in Equation (1). We report supplementary results in the Electronic Supplementary Material using the
alternative definition for competition-induced changes in heart rate variability.
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member), the higher the confidence on being the best performing member in the group. Conversely, the
higher the guessed rank (4 = the worst performing group member), the higher the confidence on being
the worst preforming member in the group.
3. Results
This section summarizes our main empirical findings. First, we investigate whether men and women
differ in their performance, winning probability and competitiveness. Second, we investigate
participants’ autonomic nervous system activity under non-competitive and competitive incentives.
Third, we examine whether heart rate variability explains individual and gender differences in selection
into a competitive environment. Finally, we evaluate the robustness of our findings and study more
closely the link between heart rate variability and willingness to compete.
3.1 Gender differences in performance, probability of winning and competitiveness
We find no significant gender differences in average performance in any task (Fig. 2, two-sided t-tests,
p > 0.13). In the piece rate incentive scheme, the average number of correctly solved problems by men
is 9.10 (Std. = 4.01) and by women 7.93 (Std. = 2.71). In the tournament, the average number of correctly
solved problems by men is 10.38 (Std. = 4.21) and by women 9.98 (Std. = 2.70).10 Consequently, both
men and women perform significantly better under the tournament (Task 2) than under the piece rate
(Task 1) compensation scheme (two-sided paired t-test, for men p = 0.01, for women p < 0.01). This
effect may be caused by learning or differences between the incentive schemes.11
On average, men consider the arithmetic task slightly more challenging than women (on a scale from 1
to 7, average for men is 4.36 and average for women is 3.80; two-sided t-test, p = 0.06). The majority of
participants (56 percent) find that the arithmetic task favors men, while only 4 percent of the participants
find that the arithmetic task favors women. The remaining 40 percent of the participants find that the
arithmetic task is gender-neutral. Thus, the majority of our participants seem to hold the stereotypical
belief that men perform better in an arithmetic task than women (Reuben et al., 2014).
10 Figure S2 in the Electronic Supplementary Material presents the distribution of men’s and women’s performance in Tasks
1 and 2.
11 The experimental design used in this study does enable to separate the effect of learning and incentives on performance. A
number of existing studies with real-effort tasks suggest that initial learning may have a substantial effect on performance. In
our study, a two-minute practice period before the first task may have reduced the impact of initial learning on performance.
11
Figure 2: The average number of correctly solved problems by task and gender. Error bars indicate the
standard error of the mean.
Even though there are no statistically significant differences in performance between men and women,
we find that men are slightly more likely to win the tournament than women. We assess the probability
of winning the tournament by performing a simulation where we draw 10000 groups consisting of two
men and two women using the sample of 39 men and 41 women with replacement. We repeat this 100
times and arrive at a result that, conditional on gender, the probability of winning the Task 2 tournament
is 30.1 percent for a man and 19.4 percent for a woman. In a sample of 39 men and 41 women, this
difference is marginally significant (two-sided t-test, p = 0.08). In particular, the probability of winning
the tournament begins to diverge for performances greater than 13 correctly solved problems (Fig. S3).
The probability of winning the tournament with 13 correctly solved problems is 55.5 percent for a man
and 48.8 percent for a woman. The probability of winning the tournament with 15 correctly solved
problems is 75.3 percent for a man and 66.2 percent for a woman.
In Task 3, 54 percent of women and 74 percent of men choose the tournament compensation scheme
(Fisher’s exact test, p-value = 0.066).12 The choice of compensation scheme does not divide women on
the basis of their performance. The women who choose the tournament incentive scheme solve only
12 Our results show that the proportion of men choosing the tournament compensation scheme in Task 3 equals the previously
reported proportions in other Western subject pools. However, the proportion of women choosing the tournament
compensation scheme is slightly higher in our experiment than in many previously reported experiments. For example, see
evidence for university students in the U.S. (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, Niederle et al., 2013), for university students in
Germany (Müller and Schwieren, 2012) and for high-school students among two different ethnic groups and the Han Chinese
in China (Zhang, 2014).
12
slightly more problems than the women who choose the piece rate (Table 1; two-sided t-tests for mean
performance, Task 1, p = 0.07; Task 2, p = 0.33; Task 3, p = 0.08; Task 2 – Task 1, p = 0.32). However,
the  choice  in  Task  3  seems  to  divide  men  into  two  groups.  The  men  who  choose  the  piece  rate
compensation scheme in Task 3 perform significantly worse in all tasks than the men who select the
tournament scheme (Table 1; two-sided t-tests for mean performance, Task 1, Task 2 & Task 3, p < 0.01;
Task 2 – Task 1, p = 0.74).
Table 1: Average performance (number of correct answers) by choice of payment scheme in Task3.
Gender Chosen Payment
Scheme
Task 1
(Piece rate)
Task 2
(Tournament)
Task 2 – Task 1 Task 3
(Own choice)
Women Piece rate
 (N=19)
7.11
(0.61)
9.53
(0.67)
2.42
(0.50)
9.84
(0.80)
Tournament
(N=22)
8.64
(0.56)
10.36
(0.53)
1.73
(0.47)
11.73
(0.70)
Men Piece rate
 (N=10)
5.80
(0.57)
6.80
(1.14)
1.00
(0.89)
8.30
(0.76)
Tournament
(N=29)
10.24
(0.73)
11.62
(0.69)
1.38
(0.59)
12.62
(0.79)
Note: Standard deviations in the parentheses.
On average, the gender difference in the tournament entry is 20 percentage points. At the same time, we
find that the gender gap in entry increases with performance. By dividing the subjects by gender and their
performance quartile in Task 2, we observe that all men in the best performing quartile choose the
tournament compensation scheme, whereas 67 percent of the women in the first quartile enter the
tournament (Fig. 3A). Gender difference in the tournament entry is marginally significant in the two
high-performing quartiles (Fisher exact test, p = 0.069, conditional on Task 2 performance), but not in
the two low-performing quartiles (Fisher exact test, p = 0.527, conditional on Task 2 performance).
13
Figure  3: The proportion of participants selecting the tournament in Task 3 conditional on Task 2
tournament performance quartile (Panel A) and the proportion of participants selecting the tournament
in Task 4 conditional on Task 1 performance quartile (Panel B).
In Task 4, 56 percent of the men and 39 percent of the women choose the tournament compensation
scheme (Fisher’s exact test, p-value = 0.179).13 By dividing the subjects by gender and their performance
quartile in Task 1 (Fig. 3B), we observe that the proportion of men and women choosing the tournament
compensation scheme is lower in all performance quartiles in Task 4 than in Task 3.
3.2. Heart rate variability and competitiveness
We have observed in Section 3.1 that men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a
competitive environment. In this section, we investigate participants’ heart rate variability under different
incentive schemes and examine whether differences in heart rate variability explain individual and gender
differences in selection into a competitive environment.
13 This result together with the results presented in Table 7 indicates that there are no significant gender differences in self-
selection into tournament in Task 4. This result replicates the findings reported by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).
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Figure 4: Mean RMSSDs by task and gender. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
We find that women on average exhibit higher absolute heart rate variability than men (Fig. 4). This
effect is statistically significant during the baseline measurement and all arithmetic tasks (two-sided t-
test for mean RMSSD, baseline: p = 0.027; Task 1: p = 0.063; Task 2: p = 0.038; Task 3: p = 0.010).
Figure 4 shows that both genders exhibit lower heart rate variability during the arithmetic tasks than
during the baseline measurement (paired two-sided t-tests for mean baseline RMSSD and Task 1 or Task
2 related RMSSD: p < 0.01 for both genders). In other words, we observe that both genders experience
an acute physiological stress response to the arithmetic task. However, we do not observe significant
difference in participants’ stress response when moving from piece rate incentives to a forced tournament
(paired two-sided t-tests for Task 1 vs. Task 2 related RMSSD: men, p = 0.126; p = 0.856).14
14 The fact that there is a substantial decrease in HRV when moving from baseline to a piece rate but no significant decrease
in HRV when moving from the piece rate to a forced tournament suggests that participants on average react stronger to the
introduction of math problems than to tournament incentives. However, this does not indicate that the initial drop in HRV is
necessarily a good predictor of voluntary selection into a competitive environment. The placebo regressions reported in the
Electronic Supplementary Material (Table S1) show that the changes in HRV when moving from baseline to the piece rate
are not associated with participants’ tournament entry decisions.
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Figure 5: Mean RMSSDs of women (Panel A) and of men (Panel B) by task and choice of payment
scheme in Task 3. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
In the following, we examine changes in heart rate variability separately for men and women. We find
that women who choose to enter the tournament in Task 3 have significantly higher baseline heart rate
variability than women who choose the piece rate incentives (Fig. 5A; two-sided t-test for mean RMSSD:
p = 0.037). Likewise, we find that the women who choose to enter the tournament in Task 3 have
significantly higher heart rate variability during Task 1 (two-sided t-test for mean RMSSD: p = 0.009),
Task 2 (two-sided t-test for mean RMSSD: p = 0.017) and Task 3 (two-sided t-test for mean RMSSD: p
= 0.026) than women who choose the piece rate incentives. By contrast, Figure 5B shows that there are
no significant differences in baseline (two-sided t-test for mean RMSSD: p = 0.960), Task 1 (two-sided
t-test for mean RMSSD: p = 0.697), Task 2 (two-sided t-test for mean RMSSD: p = 0.145) and Task 3
(two-sided t-test for mean RMSSD: p = 0.183) heart rate variability between the men who choose the
tournament and piece rate incentives. Overall, we observe that the women who shy away from the
competition have lower heart rate variability than the women who enter the competitive environment,
whereas the men who choose to enter competition exhibit similar heart rate variability than the men who
choose the piece rate incentives.
We have so far focused on the absolute heart rate variability indices during the baseline measurement
and arithmetic tasks. Figure 6 shows competition-induced changes in heart rate variability by gender and
choice of payment scheme in Task 3 using a relative RMSSD measure defined in Equation 1. We measure
competition-induced stress response as a difference in heart rate variability between the piece rate
16
incentive scheme (Task 1) and the forced tournament (Task 2). These values are normalized by dividing
the difference by Task 1 values. We find that the competition-induced change in heart rate variability is
significantly different between the men who enter the tournament in Task 3 and the men who choose the
piece rate in Task 3 (two-sided t-test, p = 0.003). In particular, we find that heart rate variability decreases
between Tasks 1 and 2 among the men who choose the tournament, whereas the heart rate variability
increases between Tasks 1 and 2 among the men who choose the piece rate incentives (Fig. 6).
Figure 6: Mean difference between RMSSD (Task2) – RMSSD (Task1), relative to the Task 1 RMMSD,
by gender and choice of payment scheme in Task 3. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
We interpret the decrease in heart rate variability among the men who enter the tournament in Task 3 as
a competition-induced acute engagement of the sympathetic nervous system. By contrast, we do not
observe that there are significant differences in competition-induced changes in heart rate variability
between those women who enter the tournament in Task 3 and those women who choose the piece rate
incentives (two-sided t-test, p = 0.231). We observe that the men who experience a competition-induced
acute engagement of the sympathetic nervous system are more likely to self-select into competition than
the men who do not experience acute engagement of the sympathetic nervous system during competition.
At the same time, we observe that the self-selection into competition is not associated with competition-
induced changes in heart rate variability among women.15
15 The results concerning the association between competition-induced changes in heart rate variability and tournament entry
among the men and women are robust to the alternative definition of competition-induced changes in heart rate variability
where we normalize the changes in RMSSD using baseline measurement instead of Task1 data. We find in Table 4 that the
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3.3 Explanations for gender differences
We have seen that both the baseline levels of HRV and the competition-induced changes in HRV are
associated with participants’ decisions to enter into a competitive environment. In the following, we
examine the robustness of these observations and assess the impact of various observable behavioral
characteristics on tournament entry decisions. We estimate various probit regressions for the tournament
entry decisions in Task 3 and Task 4.16
Table 2 shows that the gender difference in tournament entry is 20.2 percentage points after controlling
for participants’ performance in Task 2. We compare the models reported in columns (1) – (4) to assess
how the gender gap changes when including our measures for basal HRV and competition-induced
changes in HRV in the model. We find that including the basal HRV in the regression model increases
the gender gap in tournament entry from 20.2 percentage points to 23.8 percentage points. By contrast,
including competition-induced change in HRV decreases the gender difference in tournament entry from
20.2 percentage points to 17.8 percentage points. Including both stress variables in the model at the same
time (column 4) increases the gender gap to 24.1 percentage points. These changes in the gender gap are
statistically insignificant (Wald tests for the equality of coefficients: p > 0.171). Column (5) in Table 2
shows that basal HRV and competition-induced changes in HRV are significant predictors of tournament
entry after controlling for participants’ performance, confidence, risk attitude, competition attitude and
competition-induced changes in performance. Even though the basal HRV and the competition-induced
changes in HRV are significant predictors of tournament entry, they do not close the gender gap in
competitiveness.
self-selection into competition is associated with competition-induced changes in heart rate variability also among women
after controlling for their confidence and propensity to take risks.
16 We also estimate logit models for all model specifications reported in Tables 2 - 6. The results from these models are
qualitatively similar to the results presented in Tables 2 - 6. We present here only the average marginal effects of probit models
for brevity and clarity of interpretation. We report in Table 7 linear probability model estimates due to a small sample size
and clarity of interpretation. We also estimate all model specifications using participants’ (simulated) individual probability
of winning the tournament instead of participants’ performance in the tournament (for example, see Table S8). All results
reported in Tables 2 - 6 are robust to the using of individual probabilities of winning the tournament instead of participants’
performance. In addition, we estimate all model specifications using an alternative definition of competition-induced changes
in heart rate variability by normalizing the changes in RMSSD using baseline measurement instead of Task1 measurement.
All results reported in Tables 2 - 6 are robust to the using of data normalized by baseline measurement. We report in the
electronic Supplementary Material also pairwise correlation coefficients between all variables included in Tables 2 – 7 (Tables
S11-S13).
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To study the tournament  entry decisions of  men and women,  we estimate in  Tables  3  and 4 several
regression models separately for men and women. Column (1) in Table 3 shows that basal HRV is a
significant predictor of tournament entry among women. By contrast, column (2) in Table 3 shows that
the competition-induced acute stress response is not directly associated with the tournament entry among
women. However, we note that the models (1) – (3) including only measures for performance and heart
rate variability do not fit the data particularly well. Inserting variables measuring confidence and risk
aversion to the simplified regression models (column 4) has two notable consequences. First, inserting
confidence and risk aversion to the simplified model substantially improves the model’s fit.  Second, we
find that in this more accurate model both the basal HRV and competition-induced acute stress response
are statistically significant predictors of women’s tournament entry.17
Table 3: Probit models on Task-3 payment scheme choice for women
 (1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance 0.036
(0.027)
0.024
(0.027)
0.024
(0.027)
-0.005
(0.019)
Baseline RMSSD 0.008***
(0.003)
0.009***
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.002)
RMSSD change -0.004
(0.004)
-0.006
(0.004)
-0.007***
(0.003)
Confidence -0.124*
(0.065)
Risk attitude 0.086***
(0.013)
Observations 38 38 38 38
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
0.117
65.79
0.032
63.16
0.161
63.16
0.618
86.84
Table reports average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. Performance denotes
the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2. RMSSD change denotes
competition-induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values.
Confidence denotes participants’ guesses about their rank among the group members in Task 2
and takes values from 1 to 4, where lower values indicate higher self-confidence. Risk attitude
denotes participants’ answer to a general risk question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values
indicate lower willingness to take risks. ***significant at p < 0.01, **significant at p < 0.05,
*significant at p < 0.1.
17 Tables 2 - 6 report coefficients for risk attitude using a one-item survey question for general risk attitude. The qualitative
nature of the results reported in Tables 2 - 6 is robust to the alternative of using an incentive compatible method to elicit
participants’ risk preferences (Holt and Laury, 2002).
19
Column (1) in Table 4 shows that the basal HRV is not a significant predictor of tournament entry among
men. By contrast, column (2) in Table 4 shows that the competition-induced acute stress response is
associated with the tournament entry among men. Column (4) shows that the competition-induced
change in HRV remains a highly significant predictor of tournament entry after controlling for
confidence and risk attitude. We find that one standard deviation increase in the basal HRV increases the
probability of tournament entry by 33.3 percentage points among women and decreases the probability
of tournament entry by 2.3 percentage points among men. Likewise, we find that one standard deviation
increase in the competition-induced acute stress response increases the probability of tournament entry
by 29.6 percentage points among women and by 8.3 percentage points among men.
Table 4: Probit models on Task-3 payment scheme choice for men
(1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance 0.052***
(0.012)
0.041***
(0.012)
0.041***
(0.012)
0.014
(0.017)
Baseline RMSSD 0.0003
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.004)
RMSSD change -0.009***
(0.003)
-0.009***
(0.003)
-0.006**
(0.003)
Confidence -0.139**
(0.067)
Risk attitude -0.018
(0.024)
Observations 39 39 39 39
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
0.261
82.05
0.406
79.49
0.409
79.49
0.542
89.74
Table presents average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. Performance denotes the
number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2. RMSSD change denotes competition-
induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence denotes
participants’ guesses about their rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes values from 1
to 4, where lower values indicate higher self-confidence. Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer
to a general risk question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to
take risks. ***significant at p < 0.01, **significant at p < 0.05, *significant at p < 0.1.
Our results suggest that basal autonomic nervous system activity and physiological responses to
competitive stress may predict individual selection into competitive environments. We also find that
there are some differences in variables that predict the tournament entry decision among men and women.
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In particular, we observe that basal HRV and risk aversion predict entry to the tournament for women,
but not for men.18 We find that competition-induced acute stress response is associated with the
tournament entry among men in all models, whereas the association is statistically significant among
women only after controlling for confidence and risk aversion.
Table 5: Probit models on Task-3 payment scheme choice for high performers
(1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman -0.253**
(0.113)
-0.225**
(0.112)
-0.260***
(0.101)
-0.276***
(0.098)
-0.205**
(0.102)
Performance 0.041
(0.036)
0.034
(0.033)
0.018
(0.033)
0.012
(0.029)
0.001
(0.031)
Baseline RMSSD 0.004
(0.004)
0.008*
(0.005)
0.005*
(0.004)
RMSSD change -0.006**
(0.003)
-0.009**
(0.003)
-0.007**
(0.003)
Confidence -0.107
(0.083)
Risk attitude 0.023
(0.030)
Competition attitude 0.021
(0.018)
Performance change -0.119
(0.315)
Observations 38 36 36 36 36
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
0.141
76.32
0.163
77.78
0.241
88.89
0.339
86.11
0.472
88.89
Table presents average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. Woman is a dummy variable, where women
= 1 and men = 0. Performance denotes the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2. RMSSD change
denotes competition-induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence denotes
participants’ guesses about their rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes values from 1 to 4, where lower
values indicate higher self-confidence. Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general risk question on a scale
from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to take risks. Competition attitude denotes participants’
answer to a general competition attitude question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness
to compete. Performance change denotes the difference in the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems between
Tasks 2 and 1. Positive values indicate greater performance in the tournament compensation scheme than in the piece
rate. *** significant at p < 0.01, ** significant at  p < 0.05, * significant at p < 0.1.
18 We test whether there is a statistically significant difference in the impact of basal HRV and competition-induced acute
stress arousal on tournament entry between men and women. The interaction terms reported in Table S2 indicate that there
are no statistically significant gender differences in the impact of basal HRV and competition-induced acute stress response
on tournament entry.
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Table 5 complements our previous analyses by reporting the same models than Table 2 for the high-
performing participants (top 50 percent in Task 2).19 We observe in Table 5 largely the same pattern of
results than in Table 2. The gender gap in entry is 25.2 percentage points among the top performers after
controlling for performance. Consequently, the gender gap is substantially larger among the top
performers than in the entire population. Participants’ performance in Task 2 does not predict tournament
entry among the top performers. At the same time, column (3) shows that the competition-induced acute
stress response is a highly significant predictor of tournament entry among the top performers.
Furthermore, column (5) shows that the competition-induced acute stress response is the only statistically
significant predictor of tournament entry besides gender among the top performers in a model which
includes the effects of basal HRV, performance, confidence, risk attitude, general preference for
performing in a competitive environment and competition-induced changes in performance.
We have seen that the basal HRV and the competition-induced acute changes in HRV predict entry into
tournament in Task 3. In the following, we examine whether our indicators of chronic stress and acute
competitive stress predict tournament entry also in Task 4 which keeps the payoff structure unchanged
but eliminates all aspects of performing in a competitive environment. We assess the impact of basal
HRV and competition-induced acute changes in heart rate variability by estimating the same models for
tournament entry than for Task 3.
Table 6 shows that the gender difference in tournament entry in Task 4 is 12.1 percentage points after
controlling for participants’ performance in Task 1. The size of the gender gap is substantially smaller in
Task 4 than in Task 3 and statistically not significant. Columns (2) – (5) in Table 5 show that the basal
HRV and the competition-induced changes in heart rate variability do not explain entry into tournament
in Task 4. Column (5) completes the picture by investigating the effects of confidence, risk attitude and
general preference for performing in a competitive environment. We find that participants’ propensity to
take risks and confidence are the only significant predictors of tournament entry in Task 4. Overall, we
observe that the basal HRV and the competition-induced changes in HRV predict tournament entry in
Task 3, but not in Task 4. We interpret this as evidence that the basal HRV and the competition-induced
19 The models reported herein include only participates whose performance is strictly above the median. The qualitative nature
of the results presented in Table 5 is robust to including participants with a median performance in the models.  We estimate
the same model specifications reported in Table 5 also for low performers (below median performance). These models show
that there is no significant gender difference in tournament entry among the participants with a below median performance.
Competition-induced acute stress response does not significantly predict tournament entry among the low performers. The
tournament entry decision is mainly driven by baseline RMSSD values, confidence and risk attitude among the low
performers. These models are reported for brevity in the Electronic Supplementary Material (Table S3).
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changes in HRV predict tournament entry in an environment where participants have to knowingly
perform in a tournament, but not in an environment where participants do not have to perform in a
competitive environment.
Table 6: Probit models on Task-4 payment scheme choice (1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman -0.121
(0.103)
-0.123
(0.108)
-0.119
(0.105)
-0.122
(0.108)
0.068
(0.100)
Performance 0.046***
(0.015)
0.043***
(0.016)
0.046***
(0.017)
0.046***
(0.017)
0.004
(0.019)
Baseline RMSSD 0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.002)
RMSSD change 0.003
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
Confidence -0.216***
(0.055)
Risk attitude 0.071***
(0.017)
Competition attitude -0.009
(0.017)
Performance change -0.142
(0.098)
Observations 80 77 77 77 77
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
0.090
65.00
0.078
63.64
0.084
66.23
0.084
67.53
0.336
71.43
Table reports average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. Woman is a dummy variable, where
women = 1 and men = 0. Performance denotes the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2.
RMSSD change denotes competition-induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD
values. Confidence denotes participants’ guesses about their rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes
values from 1 to 4, where lower values indicate higher self-confidence. Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer
to a general risk question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to take risks.
Competition attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general competition attitude question on a scale from 1 to
10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to compete. Performance change denotes the difference in the
number of correctly solved arithmetic problems between Tasks 2 and 1. Positive values indicate greater
performance in the tournament compensation scheme than in the piece rate. ***significant at p < 0.01, **significant
at p < 0.05, *significant at p < 0.1.
We have seen that competition-induced acute engagement of the sympathetic nervous system predicts
entry into competitive environments where people have to knowingly perform in a tournament. In the
following, we complement this observation by examining more closely the role of confidence and
competition-induced changes in HRV as predictors of tournament entry. In particular, Table 7 presents
interaction coefficients between confidence and competition-induced acute stress response among men
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and women. Columns (1) and (4) show estimates among the top 50 percent based on performance in
Task 2, columns (2) and (5) show estimates among the top 75 percent based on performance in Task 2.
Finally, columns (3) and (6) show the estimates among all men and women.
 We observe that there is a significant interaction between confidence and competition-induced acute
stress response among the men. In contrast to the results reported in Table 3, we find that the
physiological response to competitive stress is not directly associated with the tournament entry decision
among all men in Table 7. However, we find that the competition-induced change in HRV and the
interaction term between the competition-induced change in HRV and confidence are jointly highly
significant predictors of tournament entry (Wald test: p = 0.02). Columns (4) - (6) show that confidence
and competition-induced change in HRV are not associated with the self-selection into tournament
among women. We conclude that the impact of autonomic nervous system activity on willingness to
compete is mediated by self-confidence among men, but not among women.
Table 7: Linear probability models on Task-3 payment scheme choice
(1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
Men Women
Top 50% Top 75 % All men Top 50% Top 75% All
women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RMSSD change 0.014*** 0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.009 0.004
(0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.028) (0.023) (0.021)
Confidence -0.182*** -0.218*** -0.248*** -0.173 -0.189 -0.223**
(0.033) (0.040) (0.040) (0.168) (0.127) (0.101)
RMSSD change x -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.007 -0.004
Confidence (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Constant 1.172*** 1.190*** 1.245*** 1.162*** 0.999*** 1.068***
(0.029) (0.065) (0.070) (0.082) (0.323) (0.251)
Observations 20 31 39 16 31 38
R2 0.671 0.615 0.506 0.161 0.160 0.160
Table reports linear probability model coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. RMSSD change denotes
competition-induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence denotes
participants’ guesses about their rank among the group members and takes values from 1 to 4, where lower values
indicate higher confidence.  RMSSD change x Confidence is an interaction term. ***significant at p < 0.01,
**significant at p < 0.05, *significant at p < 0.1
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4 Conclusions
There are pervasive gender differences in labor market outcomes, educational attainment and political
empowerment across cultures and political systems. At the same time, competitive incentive schemes
and tournament-based promotion mechanisms pervade the work place and political organization. This
paper aims to increase our understanding of individual and gender differences in competitiveness by
developing an experimental design which enables to measure chronic stress as well as the acute
physiological effects of competitive stress. We use this data to examine whether physiological effects of
stress can predict entry into competitive incentive schemes.
Our results show that basal heart rate variability and acute physiological response to competitive stress
are strong predictors of participants' entry into competition. However, the associations between heart rate
variability and participants’ decisions to enter competition are not significantly different between men
and women. Overall, our results suggest that individual variation in basal autonomic nervous system
activity and physiological responses to competitive stress predict self-selection into competitive
environments, but do not explain gender differences in willingness to compete
This study establishes an association between autonomic nervous system activity and willingness to
compete. There is little doubt that the same biological foundations that guide participants’ behavior in
our experimental setting guide individuals’ behavior and decisions in the real world. However, there is
larger uncertainty about the external relevance of our findings. While we are not capable to directly assess
the question of external relevance using our existing data, a representative survey of the U.S. population
(APA, 2009) documents that more than 50 percent of the employees have considered or made a decision
about their career such as looking for a new job, declining a promotion or leaving a job based on work-
related stress. This evidence suggests that our findings may have some external relevance and open new
perspectives to understand the causes of individual differences in labor market outcomes, educational
attainment and political empowerment.
If our results have external relevance, they would indicate that individual variation in autonomous
nervous system activity explains people’s educational and career-related decisions. This result would in
turn have important ramifications for the design of optimal organizations and incentive schemes. In
particular, the result that a physiological indicator of accumulated distress explains women’s decisions
to enter competition may provide a partial explanation for the pervasive under representation of high-
qualified women in competitive organizations. Thus, speculatively, our findings suggest that
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organizational structures and work environments that achieve healthy levels of occupational stress may
automatically facilitate the self-selection of women into competitive professional positions.
The robustness of our results and their external relevance has to be further studied before we can begin
to make forceful arguments that the observed regularities readily generalize to naturally-occurring
environments. While there is preliminary evidence showing that experimentally elicited preferences for
competition are associated with different field measures of educational attainment, there is large
uncertainty about the relevance of our physiological stress measures. It is important to notice that reliable
physiological measurement of stress remains challenging and is subject to difficulties in interpretation.
There is no clear consensus about the validity and reliability of alternative measurement techniques. Only
future research can show whether our results can be replicated in other circumstances and using
alternative techniques for physiological stress measurement. It also remains to be studied whether
inducing distress or relaxation before making decisions about the future compensation schemes have a
causal effect on competitiveness. Finally, an important question is whether currently recommended
practices for stress management by medical institutions affect employees’ willingness to enter
competitive environments
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1. Material and Methods
1.1 Computation of the Root Mean Square of Successive Intervals
We use throughout the paper the Root Mean Square of Successive Differences (RMSSD) to measure the
variation of beat-to-beat (BTB) intervals. The RMMSD is defined as
ܴܯܵܵܦ = ට ଵ
ேିଵ
∑ (ܤܶܤ௝ାଵ − ܤܶܤ௝)ଶேିଵ௝ୀଵ ,
where ܤܶܤ௝ denotes the value of jth beat-to-beat interval and N is the total number of successive
intervals.
1.2 Information about the Heart Rate Variability Measurement Device
We measured our participants' beat-to-beat intervals using the FirstBeat Bodyguard1 heart rate monitor.
The device was attached to skin using two electrodes: one (yellow snap) to the right side of the body,
just below the collar bone, and the another (red snap) to the left side of the body below the heart (on the
rib cage). The measurement accuracy for recording beat-to-beat intervals is 1 ms with a sampling
frequency of 1000 Hz. The accuracy of the measurement device does not differ from standard clinical
ECG recording devices with off-line R-wave detection.
Figure S1. Heart rate variability measurement device.
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2. Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure S2: A) The performance distribution of men and women in Task 2. B) The probability of winning
the tournament by gender in Task 2.
Figure S3: The probability of winning the tournament for a given performance among the men and
women.
A. B.
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We find a significant gender difference in the average number of incorrectly solved problems in both
competitive tasks (Fig. S1). Men make more mistakes than women in Task 2 (two-sided t-test, p = 0.02)
and in Task 3 (two-sided t-test, p = 0.05).
Figure S4: The average number of incorrectly solved problems by task and gender. Error bars indicate
the standard error of the mean.
Figure S5: A) The distribution of RMMSD values during the baseline measurement among the men and
women. B) The distribution of competition-induced changes in heart rate variability among the men and
women.
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Table S1: Placebo regressions for Task-3 and Task-4 payment scheme choice
(1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
Task 3 Task 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Women Men Men top 50% Men top 50% All
Woman -0.568
(0.323)
-0.327
(0.298)
Performance 0.182***
(0.057)
0.104
(0.084)
0.238***
(0.091)
0.116**
(0.050)
Baseline – Task 1 -1.331
(0.836)
-2.108*
(1.136)
-0.514
(1.377)
28.725
(28.246)
-3.473
(50.471)
-0.007
(0.764)
Confidence 0.503
(1.753)
Confidence ×
Baseline – Task 1
-13.643
(13.755)
Risk attitude -1.148
(0.991)
Risk attitude ×
Baseline – Task 1
1.808
(6.688)
Constant -0.890*
(0.532)
-0.564
(0.815)
-0.564
(0.815)
0.221
(3.419)
7.609
(6.237)
-0.863*
(0.481)
Observations
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
77
0.156
67.53
38
0.082
68.42
39
0.264
82.05
20
0.396
95.00
20
0.355
85.00
77
0.078
63.64
Table reports probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Woman is a dummy variable,
where women = 1 and men = 0. Performance denotes the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in
Task 2 in columns 1-5. Performance denotes the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 1 in
column 6. Baseline – Task 1 denotes the difference in RMSSD between the baseline measurement and Task1
measurement in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence denotes participants’ guesses about their rank among
the group members in Task 2 and takes values from 1 to 4, where lower values indicate higher self-confidence.
Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general risk question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values
indicate lower willingness to take risks. Confidence × Baseline – Task 1 and Risk attitude × Baseline – Task 1
are interaction terms. ***significant at p < 0.01, **significant at p < 0.05, *significant at p < 0.1.
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Table S2: Probit-regressions on Task-3 payment scheme choice
( 1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3)
Woman -1.317
(0.802)
-0.589
(0.325)
-5.284
(3.439)
Baseline RMSSD 0.002
(0.019)
-0.009
(0.029)
RMSSD change -0.054***
(0.021)
-0.044*
(0.024)
Woman ´ Baseline
RMSSD
0.019
(0.022)
0.058
(0.037)
Woman ´ RMSSD change 0.041*
(0.023)
-0.005
(0.034)
Performance 0.099
(0.120)
Confidence -0.950*
(0.527)
Risk attitude -0.120
(0.162)
Woman ´ Performance -0.132
(0.177)
Woman ´ Confidence 0.085
(0.745)
Woman ´ Risk attitude 0.718***
(0.267)
Constant 0.594
(0.650)
0.702***
(0.250)
2.944
(2.383)
Number of subjects
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
77
0.076
62.34
77
0.135
67.53
77
0.591
88.31
Table  reports  probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Woman is a dummy
variable, where women = 1 and men = 0. Performance denotes the number of correctly solved arithmetic
problems in Task 2. Stress arousal denotes competition-induced change in heart rate variability
measured in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence denotes participants’ guesses about their rank
among the group members in Task 2 and takes values from 1 to 4, where lower values indicate higher
self-confidence. Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general risk question on a scale from 1
to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to take risks. ***significant at p < 0.01,
**significant at p < 0.05, *significant at p < 0.1.
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Table S3: Probit models on Task-3 payment scheme choice for low performers
(1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman -0.168
(0.144)
-0.264*
(0.145)
-0.132
(0.147)
-0.249*
(0.145)
-0.179*
(0.106)
Performance 0.082**
(0.035)
0.077**
(0.033)
0.076**
(0.035)
0.075**
(0.033)
0.046
(0.030)
Baseline RMSSD 0.008**
(0.004)
0.007**
(0.004)
0.010***
(0.004)
RMSSD change -0.005
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.004)
Confidence -0.227***
(0.048)
Risk attitude 0.052**
(0.022)
Competition attitude -0.002
(0.019)
Performance change -0.186*
(0.107)
Observations
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
42
0.085
66.67
41
0.141
68.29
41
0.095
65.85
41
0.156
60.98
41
0.537
90.24
Table presents average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses.  Woman is  a dummy variable,  where
women = 1 and men = 0. Performance denotes the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2. RMSSD
change denotes competition-induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values.
Confidence denotes participants’ guesses about their rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes values from
1 to 4, where lower values indicate higher self-confidence. Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general
risk question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to take risks. Competition attitude
denotes participants’ answer to a general competition attitude question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values
indicate lower willingness to compete. Performance change denotes the difference in the number of correctly solved
arithmetic problems between Tasks 2 and 1. Positive values indicate greater performance in the tournament
compensation scheme than in the piece rate. ***significant at p < 0.01, **significant at p < 0.05, *significant at p <
0.1.
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Table S4: Probit models on Task-3 payment scheme choice (1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman -0.631**
(0.313)
-0.796**
(0.339)
-0.584*
(0.323)
-0.874**
(0.357)
-0.769*
(0.433)
Performance 0.151***
(0.050)
0.166***
(0.052)
0.126**
(0.051)
0.147***
(0.054)
0.088
(0.077)
Baseline RMSSD 0.022**
(0.010)
0.026**
(0.011)
0.039***
(0.013)
RMSSD change -0.019*
(0.010)
-0.023**
(0.010)
-0.034***
(0.013)
Confidence -0.990***
(0.308)
Risk attitude 0.215**
(0.096)
Competition attitude 0.037
(0.073)
Performance change -0.841
(0.529)
Constant -0.783
(0.511)
-1.610**
(0.651)
-0.553
(0.526)
-1.550**
(0.672)
0.159
(1.426)
Observations
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
80
0.137
66.25
77
0.186
76.62
77
0.168
67.53
77
0.240
71.43
77
0.486
87.01
Table reports probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Woman is a dummy variable, where women =
1 and men = 0. Performance denotes the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2. RMSSD change
denotes competition-induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence
denotes participants’ guesses about their rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes values from 1 to 4,
where lower values indicate higher self-confidence. Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general risk
question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to take risks. Competition attitude
denotes participants’ answer to a general competition attitude question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values
indicate lower willingness to compete. Performance change denotes the difference in the number of correctly solved
arithmetic problems between Tasks 2 and 1. Positive values indicate greater performance in the tournament
compensation scheme than in the piece rate. ***significant at p < 0.01, **significant at  p < 0.05, *significant at p <
0.1.
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Table S5: Probit models on Task-3 payment scheme choice for women
(1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance 0.105
(0.082)
0.035
(0.080)
0.087
(0.085)
-0.033
(0.130)
Baseline RMSSD 0.025**
(0.011)
0.029**
(0.013)
0.049**
(0.023)
RMSSD change -0.012
(0.012)
-0.019
(0.013)
-0.049**
(0.023)
Confidence -0.864
(0.528)
Risk attitude 0.598***
(0.212)
Constant -1.901
(1.044)
-0.228
(0.818)
-1.855*
(1.081)
-2.340
(2.480)
Observations
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
38
0.117
65.79
38
0.000
63.16
38
0.161
63.16
38
0.618
86.84
Table reports probit coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Performance denotes the number of
correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2. RMSSD change denotes competition-induced change in heart
rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence denotes participants’ guesses about their
rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes values from 1 to 4, where lower values indicate higher self-
confidence. Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general risk question on a scale from 1 to 10 where
lower values indicate lower willingness to take risks. ***significant at p < 0.01, **significant at p < 0.05, *
significant at p < 0.1.
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Table S6: Probit models on Task-3 payment scheme choice for men
(1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance 0.223***
(0.079)
0.224**
(0.091)
0.223**
(0.092)
0.098
(0.122)
Baseline RMSSD 0.001
(0.021)
-0.010
(0.026)
-0.006
(0.030)
RMSSD change -0.050**
(0.022)
-0.051**
(0.023)
5.556*
(2.944)
Confidence -0.947*
(0.546)
Risk attitude -0.122
(0.164)
Constant -1.469
(0.976)
-1.320
(0.810)
-0.989
(1.166)
2.846
(2.432)
Observations
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified
(%)
39
0.261
82.05
39
0.406
79.49
39
0.409
79.49
39
0.542
89.74
The table reports probit coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Performance denotes the number of
correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2. RMSSD change denotes competition-induced change in heart
rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence denotes participants’ guesses about their
rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes values from 1 to 4, where lower values indicate higher
self-confidence. Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general risk question on a scale from 1 to 10
where lower values indicate lower willingness to take risks. ***significant at p < 0.01, **significant at p <
0.05, *significant at p < 0.1.
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Table S7: Probit models on Task-3 payment scheme choice for high performers
(1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6)
Woman -0.967*
(0.504)
-0.916*
(0.519)
-1.149**
(0.562)
-1.406**
(0.655)
-1.348*
(0.778)
Performance 0.155
(0.050)
0.138
(0.139)
0.078
(0.148)
0.061
(0.148)
0.005
(0.202)
Baseline RMSSD 0.017
(0.017)
0.041*
(0.027)
0.032
(0.031)
RMSSD change -0.028*
(0.014)
-0.044**
(0.021)
-0.045**
(0.022)
Confidence -0.703
(0.593)
Risk attitude 0.152
(0.201)
Competition attitude 0.136
(0.124)
Performance change -0.781
(2.073)
Constant 0.712
(1.823)
-1.100
(1.893)
0.281
(1.961)
-0.731
(2.073)
0.806
(4.159)
Observations
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
38
0.141
76.32
36
0.163
77.78
36
0.241
88.89
36
0.449
86.11
36
0.472
88.89
Table reports probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Woman is a dummy variable, where women = 1 and men
= 0. Performance denotes the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2. RMSSD change denotes competition-
induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence denotes participants’ guesses about
their rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes values from 1 to 4, where lower values indicate higher self-confidence.
Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general risk question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower
willingness to take risks. Competition attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general competition attitude question on a scale
from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to compete. Performance change denotes the difference in the
number of correctly solved arithmetic problems between Tasks 2 and 1. Positive values indicate greater performance in the
tournament compensation scheme than in the piece rate. ***significant at p < 0.01, **significant at p < 0.05, *significant at p
< 0.1.
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Table S8: Probit models on Task-4 payment scheme choice
(1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman -0.337
(0.293)
-0.338
(0.304)
-0.327
(0.298)
-0.335
(0.305)
-0.169
(0.339)
Performance 0.128**
(0.050)
0.117**
(0.050)
0.126**
(0.052)
0.127**
(0.052)
0.094
(0.065)
Baseline RMSSD 0.001
(0.008)
0.001
(0.008)
0.001
(0.009)
RMSSD change 0.007
(0.009)
0.007
(0.009)
0.004
(0.010)
Confidence -0.315
(0.226)
Risk attitude 0.244***
(0.079)
Competition attitude -0.035
(0.068)
Performance change -0.894**
(0.409)
Constant -0.970**
(0.476)
-0.917
(0.572)
-0.936*
(0.490)
-0.976*
(0.579)
-0.457
(1.203)
Observations
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
80
0.090
65.00
77
0.078
63.64
77
0.084
66.23
77
0.084
67.53
77
0.247
71.43
The table reports probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Woman is a dummy variable, where
women = 1 and men = 0. Performance denotes the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2.
RMSSD change denotes competition-induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD
values. Confidence denotes participants’ guesses about their rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes
values from 1 to 4, where lower values indicate higher self-confidence. Risk attitude denotes participants’
answer to a general risk question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to take
risks. Competition attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general competition attitude question on a scale
from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to compete. Performance change denotes the
difference in the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems between Tasks 2 and 1. Positive values indicate
greater performance in the tournament compensation scheme than in the piece rate. ***significant at p < 0.01,
**significant at p < 0.05, *significant at p < 0.1.
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Table S9: Probit models on Task-3 payment scheme choice (1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman -0.165*
(0.095)
-0.200**
(0.093)
-0.148
(0.094)
-0.207**
(0.089)
-0.130*
(0.073)
Probability of winning 0.564***
(0.191)
0.575***
(0.185)
0.419**
(0.195)
0.448**
(0.181)
0.127
(0.166)
Baseline RMSSD 0.006**
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.002)
RMSSD change -0.006**
(0.003)
-0.007**
(0.003)
-0.007***
(0.002)
Confidence -0.199***
(0.042)
Risk attitude 0.040**
(0.016)
Competition attitude 0.006
(0.013)
Performance change -0.134
(0.090)
Observations
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
80
0.111
65.00
77
0.156
67.53
77
0.145
63.64
77
0.212
71.43
77
0.479
85.71
Table presents average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. Woman is a dummy variable, where women = 1
and men = 0. Probability of winning denotes participants’ simulated probability of winning the tournament in Task 2. RMSSD
change denotes competition-induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence
denotes participants’ guesses about their rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes values from 1 to 4, where lower
values indicate higher self-confidence. Risk attitude denotes participants’ answer to a general risk question on a scale from 1
to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to take risks. Competition attitude denotes participants’ answer to a
general competition attitude question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower willingness to compete.
Performance change denotes the difference in the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems between Tasks 2 and 1.
Positive values indicate greater performance in the tournament compensation scheme than in the piece rate. ***significant at
p < 0.01, **significant at p < 0.05, *significant at p < 0.1.
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Table S10: Probit models on Task-3 payment scheme choice (1 = tournament, 0 = piece rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman -0.202**
(0.092)
-0.237***
(0.090)
-0.178*
(0.091)
-0.241***
(0.086)
-0.156**
(0.075)
Performance 0.048***
(0.013)
0.049***
(0.013)
0.038***
(0.014)
0.040***
(0.013)
0.018
(0.014)
Baseline RMSSD 0.006**
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.003)
0.008***
(0.002)
RMSSD change -0.006**
(0.003
-0.006**
(0.003)
-0.006***
(0.002)
Confidence -0.204***
(0.049)
Risk attitude
(Holt & Laury)
-0.046***
(0.016)
Competition attitude 0.006
(0.014)
Performance change -0.196**
(0.090)
Observations
Pseudo R2
Correctly classified (%)
80
0.137
66.25
77
0.186
76.62
77
0.168
67.53
77
0.240
71.43
73
0.497
83.56
Table presents average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. Woman is a dummy variable, where women = 1
and men = 0. Performance denotes the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems in Task 2. RMSSD change denotes
competition-induced change in heart rate variability measured in normalized RMSSD values. Confidence denotes
participants’ guesses about their rank among the group members in Task 2 and takes values from 1 to 4, where lower values
indicate higher self-confidence. Risk attitude (Holt & Laury) denotes the point where participants switch from the low risk
option to the high risk option. Higher values indicate lower willingness to take risks. Competition attitude denotes
participants’ answer to a general competition attitude question on a scale from 1 to 10 where lower values indicate lower
willingness to compete. Performance change denotes the difference in the number of correctly solved arithmetic problems
between Tasks 2 and 1. Positive values indicate greater performance in the tournament compensation scheme than in the
piece rate. ***significant at p < 0.01, **significant at p < 0.05, *significant at p < 0.1.
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Table S11: Pairwise correlation coefficients, all participants
Willingness
to compete Performance
Baseline
RMSSD
RMSSD
change Confidence Risk attitude
Competition
attitude
Performance
change
Willingness
to compete 1.000
Performance 0.345*** 1.000
Baseline
RMSSD 0.156 -0.125 1.000
RMSSD
change -0.295*** 0.233** 0.073 1.000
Confidence -0.512*** -0.522*** 0.0905 0.117 1.000
Risk attitude 0.360*** 0.049 0.001 -0.011 -0.110 1.000
Competition
attitude 0.220* 0.110 -0.206* -0.067 -0.265** 0.287** 1.000
Performance
change -0.060 0.313*** 0.100 -0.073 -0.188* -0.227** -0.177 1.000
*** significant at p < 0.01, ** significant at p < 0.05, * significant at p < 0.1
Table S12: Pairwise correlations coefficients, all men
Willingness
to compete Performance
Baseline
RMSSD
RMSSD
change Confidence Risk attitude
Competition
attitude
Performance
change
Willingness
to compete 1.000
Performance 0.507*** 1.000
Baseline
RMSSD 0.015 -0.037 1.000
RMSSD
change -0.441*** -0.183 -0.261 1.000
Confidence -0.636*** -0.635*** -0.061 0.287* 1.000
Risk attitude -0.156 -0.033 -0.159 0.032 0.176 1.000
Competition
attitude 0.162 0.170 -0.061 -0.113 -0.197 0.298* 1.000
Performance
change 0.019 0.403** 0.199 0.034 -0.271* -0.184 -0.212 1.000
*** significant at p < 0.01, ** significant at p < 0.05, * significant at p < 0.1
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Table S13: Pairwise correlation coefficients, all women
Willingness
to compete Performance
Baseline
RMSSD
RMSSD
change Confidence Risk attitude
Competition
attitude
Performance
change
Willingness
to compete 1.000
Performance 0.157 1.000
Baseline
RMSSD 0.323** -0.209 1.000
RMSSD
change -0.197 -0.323** 0.205 1.000
Confidence -0.359** -0.320** 0.132 -0.044 1.000
Risk attitude 0.679*** 0.136 0.125 -0.031 -0.344** 1.000
Competition
attitude 0.240 0.021 -0.263 -0.030 -0.322** 0.264* 1.000
Performance
change -0.072 0.208 -0.015 -0.182 -0.157 -0.240 -0.119 1.000
*** significant at p < 0.01, ** significant at p < 0.05, * significant at p < 0.1
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3. Instructions
General information
You will participate in a study which is conducted by the Aalto University and the Joint Research Centre
of the European Commission. Your responses will be strictly confidential, meaning that your name will
never be associated with your test results. Please read the instructions carefully. Please do not
communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you have any questions, please, raise your
hand. We will answer your question personally.
We will measure your heart rate variability during the experiment. After reading these instructions, you
have to install the heart rate monitor you will find on your desk. The device is attached to the skin with
two sticky electrodes. The other end is attached to the right side, below the collarbone, and the other end
to the left side, to the costal arch (see the instructions next to the device). After you have installed the
heart rate monitor, you should sit still and avoid unnecessary movements. The device saves heart rate
and motion data. We will use later this data in our analysis.
During the experiment, you will be asked to answer questions, for example, about your risk attitude, your
life situation and your personal background. Please answer those questions carefully, as your answers
are of utmost importance when analyzing the results of the experiment. The actual experimental task will
consist of several different tasks. You will get separate instructions prior to each task.
At the end of the experiment, we will pay you 5 euros for participation. In addition, you can earn more
during the experiment. Your earnings will depend on your own choices as well as on the decisions of
other participants during the experiment. The experiment consists of five different tasks and there is
always a break between the tasks. Each task will take up to five minutes. At the end of the experiment,
one of the five pay-off relevant tasks will be selected at random. This randomly selected task will
determine your pay-off from the experiment. Since your earnings will be determined on the basis of a
randomly selected task, it is in your best interest to pay special attention to all the tasks assigned to you.
Your earnings are differently determined in different tasks. In total, the experiment lasts about an hour.
You can drop out of the experiment at any point for any reason.
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In summary, your total earnings in this experiment consist of 5 Euro participation fee, a pay-off related
with a randomly selected task, and a pay-off related with one background questionnaire. At the end of
the experiment, your earnings will be paid to you in private.
Thank you for your participation!
0. Practice task
Before the start of the actual experiment, you can familiarize yourself with the experimental procedures
and practice the use of the computer. In the following, the computer will display five randomly selected
two-digit numbers. Your task is to calculate the sum of these numbers. During this practice period, you
have two minutes to calculate the correct sum of as many series of numbers as possible.
You are not allowed to use a calculator or any other electronic devices to solve the problems. We have
placed a pen and scratch paper in your cubicle. You can use the pen and paper at your own discretion.
You submit your answers using your computer mouse and keyboard. You will have to enter your answer
in the box at the end of each line. When you have answered, you will get the next five numbers. Your
answers to the problems are anonymous. No other participant will see your answers at any stage. Your
performance during the practice task does not affect your final payment. Once you have understood the
instruction click CONTINUE on the computer screen. The task begins once all subjects are ready.
1. Task [Piece rate payment]
The computer will display five randomly selected two-digit numbers. Your task is to calculate the sum
of the numbers. You have five minutes to calculate the correct sum of as many series of numbers as
possible.
You are not allowed to use a calculator or any other electronic devices to solve the problems. We have
placed a pen and scratch paper in your cubicle. You can use these devices at your own discretion. You
submit your answers using your computer mouse and keyboard. You will have to enter your answer in
the box at the end of each line. When you have answered, you will get the next five numbers. Your
answers to the problems are anonymous. No other participant will see your answers at any stage.
47
If this task is the one randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment, you will earn 25 cents
of every problem you solved correctly. Wrong answers do not lower the payment. We refer to this
payment scheme as the piece rate payment.
Once you have understood the instruction click CONTINUE on the computer screen. The task begins
when all subjects are ready.
2. Task [Tournament payment]
The computer will display five randomly selected two-digit numbers. Your task is to calculate the sum
of the numbers. You have five minutes to calculate the correct sum of as many series of numbers as
possible.
You are not allowed to use a calculator or any other electronic devices to solve the problems. We have
placed a pen and scratch paper in your cubicle. You can use these devices at your own discretion. You
submit your answers using your computer mouse and keyboard. You will have to enter your answer in
the box at the end of each line. When you have answered, you will get the next five numbers. Your
answers to the problems are anonymous. No other participant will see your answers at any stage.
During the task, you will belong to a group of four. The members in each group are randomly selected
so that each group includes both men and women. If this period is selected for the payment at the end of
the experiment, your pay-off is based on your performance in comparison with the other group members.
The individual, who correctly solves the largest number of problems, will earn 100 cents for every
problem he/she solved correctly. Wrong answers do not lower the payment. The other group members
do not earn anything. In the event of a tie, the winner will be randomly determined. You will not be
informed about your rank until the very end of the experiment. We refer to this payment scheme as the
tournament payment.
Once you have understood the instruction click CONTINUE on the computer screen. The task begins
once all subjects are ready.
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3. Task [Own choice]
As in the previous tasks, the computer will display five randomly selected two-digit numbers. Your task
is to calculate the sum of the numbers. You have five minutes to calculate the correct sum of as many
series of numbers as possible.
You are not allowed to use a calculator or any other electronic devices to solve the problems. We have
placed a pen and scratch paper in your cubicle. You can use these devices at your own discretion. You
submit your answers using your computer mouse and keyboard. You will have to enter your answer in
the box at the end of each line. When you have answered, you will get the next five numbers. Your
answers to the problems are anonymous. No other participant will see your answers at any stage.
In contrast to the previous tasks, you can now choose between the two previous payment schemes. If this
task is the one randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment, your earnings are determined
as follows:
a) If you choose the piece rate payment, you will earn 25 cents of every problem you solved
correctly. Wrong answers do not lower your payment.
b) If you choose the tournament payment, your earnings are based on your performance in
comparison to the members of the same group as in the previous task (Task 2 – Tournament
payment). If you choose the tournament payment and correctly solve more problems than the
other members of your group solved during the Task 2, you will earn 100 cents for each problem
you solved correctly. Wrong answers do not lower the payment. If you choose the tournament
payment, but you do not manage to correctly solve more problems than the best of the other
members in your group during the Period 2, you will not earn anything. In the event of a tie, the
winner will be randomly determined.
You can indicate the desired payment scheme by selecting the scheme on your computer screen.
Once you have understood the instructions and selected the desired payment scheme click CONTINUE
on the computer screen. The task begins when all subjects are ready.
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4. Task [New choice]
In this task, you do not have to add numbers. Instead, you can reconsider the Task 1 (Piece rate payment).
Your task is to choose the payment scheme you want to be applied to your performance in the Task 1.
You can choose either the piece rate or the tournament payment.
If this task is the one randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment, your earnings are
determined as follows:
a) If you choose the piece rate payment, you will earn 25 cents of every problem you solved
correctly in the Task 1. Wrong answers do not lower the payment.
b) If you choose the tournament payment, and you correctly solved more problems than the other
members or your group solved during the Task1, you will earn 100 cents for each problem you
solved correctly. The group is the same as in the Tasks 2 and 3. Wrong answers do not lower the
payment. If you choose the tournament payment, but you did not manage to solve correctly more
problems than the best of the other members of your group solved during the Task 1, you will not
earn anything. In the event of a tie, the winner will be randomly determined.
On the computer screen, you are now told how many problems you solved correctly during the Task 1,
and you are requested to indicate your desired payment scheme.
Once you have understood the instruction click CONTINUE on the computer screen. The task begins
once all subjects are ready.
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Risk Elicitation
Below are listed a variety of risky lotteries. On each row there are two options, A and B. For example,
in the first A-option, you can win 2 euro with probability of 1/10 and 1.60 euro with probability of 9/10,
while in the first B-option, you can win 3.85 euro with probability 1/10 and 0.10 euro with probability
of 9/10. Mark in every row below which of the option do you prefer, A or B. After you have filled out
the form we will randomly select one row and either option A or B. You will be paid based on your
choice and the random draw.
Option A Option B A or B?
1/10 of 2.00 € 9/10 of 1.60 € 1/10 of 3.85 € 9/10 of 0.10 €
2/10 of 2.00 € 8/10 of 1.60 € 2/10 of 3.85 € 8/10 of 0.10 €
3/10 of 2.00 € 7/10 of 1.60 € 3/10 of 3.85 € 7/10 of 0.10 €
4/10 of 2.00 € 6/10 of 1.60 € 4/10 of 3.85 € 6/10 of 0.10 €
5/10 of 2.00 € 5/10 of 1.60 € 5/10 of 3.85 € 5/10 of 0.10 €
6/10 of 2.00 € 4/10 of 1.60 € 6/10 of 3.85 € 4/10 of 0.10 €
7/10 of 2.00 € 3/10 of 1.60 € 7/10 of 3.85 € 3/10 of 0.10 €
8/10 of 2.00 € 2/10 of 1.60 € 8/10 of 3.85 € 2/10 of 0.10 €
9/10 of 2.00 € 1/10 of 1.60 € 9/10 of 3.85 € 1/10 of 0.10 €
10/10 of 2.00 € 0/10 of 1.60 € 10/10 of 3.85 € 0/10 of 0.10 €
